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corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 u.s. 
143 (1987), where the Court noted that 
Congress fashioned RICO after § 4 ofthe 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.c. § 15(a). Relying on 
dicta, Petitioners asserted that because 
§ 4 of the Clayton Act has been interpre-
ted to confer exclusive jurisdiction on 
the federal courts, it should be inferred 
that Congress intended, by the use of 
similar language in RICO, that the Court 
interpret RICO the same way. The Court 
rejected this argument and pointed out 
that "the question is not whether any 
intent at all may be divined from legisla-
tive silence on the issue, but whether 
Congress in its deliberations may be said 
to have affirmatively or unmistakably in-
tended jurisdiction to be exclusively fed-
eral." TaJjlin, 110 S. Ct. at 797. 
Additionally, the petitioners argued 
that to permit concurrent state court ju-
risdiction over civil RICO claims would 
be incompatible with federal interests. 
The petitioners first maintained that fed-
eral interests in a uniform interpretation 
of federal criminal law would be frus-
trated if state courts were permitted to 
hear civil RICO claims. Id. Further, they 
contended that for a state court to decide 
a civil RICO claim would require states to 
determine which federal crimes consti-
tute "racketeering activity" under RICO 
and would thereby create a diverse body 
of precedent interpreting those crimes. 
Id. at 798. The Court rejected both of 
Petitioner's arguments. 
The Court explained that there would 
be no danger of inconsistent interpreta-
tion of federal crimes because, pursuant 
to 18 U.S.c. § 3231, federal courts would 
retain "full authority and responsibility 
for the interpretation of federal criminal 
law." Id. The Court also stated that the 
federal courts would not be bound by 
state court interpretations offederallaw. 
Because this case involved civil RICO 
claims, there was no danger of non-uni-
form imposition of federal criminal sanc-
tions. Finally, the Court indicated that it 
had "full faith in the ability of state courts 
to handle the complexities of civil RICO 
actions, particularly since many RICO 
cases involve asserted violations of state 
law, such as state fraud claims, over 
which state courts presumably have 
greater expertise. Id. 
The Court briefly addressed the 
petitioners' final contention that RICO's 
procedural mechanisms are applicable 
only to federal court actions. The peti-
tioners maintained that RICO provides 
for extended venue and out of state ser-
vice of process which the state court 
systems could not properly handle. In 
response, the Court pointed out that it 
had "previously found concurrent juris-
diction even where federal law provided 
for special procedural mechanisms sim-
ilar to those contained in RICO." Id. at 
799 (citations omitted). The Court found 
no merit in the Petitioners' procedural 
argument. Thus, the Court concluded 
that state courts have concurrent juris-
diction over civil RICO claims. 
In the first of two concurring opinions, 
justice White agreed with the majority's 
holding but wrote separately to express 
his fear that permitting concurrent juris-
diction over civil RICO actions would 
inevitably result in diverse state court 
interpretation of federal criminal law. 
justice White, however, did not believe 
the possibility of non-uniform construc-
tion warranted a rmding of exclusive fed-
eral jurisdiction. Id. at BOO. 
justice Scalia, joined by justice Ken-
nedy, also wrote a concuring opinion. 
Both Justice Scalia and justice Kennedy 
agreed with the majority's finding that a 
civil RICO claim does not meet any of the 
three Gulf Offshore factors, and, ther-
fore, that state court jurisdicition was not 
preempted. However, neither justice 
Scalia nor justice Kennedy belived that 
the Gulf Offshore factors should be the 
sole criteria for evaluation to determine 
whether state court jurisdiction had been 
preempted. 
Despite some minor disagreement 
among the justices in TaJjlin, a unani-
mous Court agreed that Congress had not 
intended to preempt state court jurisdiC-
tion over civil RICO claims. Not only does 
the TaJjlin precedent confer greater 
power to the states, but it serves as a 
model for evaluating whether state court 
jurisdiction had been preempted. 
-David B. Applefeld 
Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.: 
VOLUNfARILY REfIRED CIAIMANf 
ENITILED TO TEMPORARY TOTAL 
DISABllJ1Y BENEFITS AFfER RETIRE-
MENf 
In Victor v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. 
Co., 318 Md. 624, 569 A.2d 697 (1990), 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland held 
that a claimant who voluntarily retires is 
entitled to the temporary total disability 
benefits under the Worker's Compensa-
tion Act ("the Act"). In so holding, the 
court reversed the trial court's ruling, and 
upheld the decision of the Workers' 
Compensation Commission. 
Edward Victor, a Proctor and Gamble 
employee, sustained a disability resulting 
from an accidental personal injury arising 
out of and in the course of his employ-
ment. He was first awarded total disabil-
ity, and later, granted a supplemental 
award for permanant partial disability. 
Although Victor was physically able to 
work at the time, he voluntarily retired 
from Proctor & Gamble. Subsequently, 
his work-related condition worsened, 
causing temporary total disability. 
Because of his worsening condition, 
the Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion reopened Victor's case and awarded 
him a continuation of his temporary total 
disability benefits. The Commission, 
however, ordered that the payment of 
the award be suspended pending any 
appeal because it questioned whether 
such benefits, which are ordinarily 
awarded until maximum medical im-
provement is achieved, are available to a 
retired claimant. On Proctor & Gamble's 
appeal to the Circuit Court for Baltimore 
City, the trial court reversed the 
Commission's ruling, stating that the 
Act's purpose is not to provide additional 
retirement benefits to a claimant who 
voluntarily removes himself from the 
work force. The court of appeals certi-
fied the case before a ruling by the court 
of special appeals. 
In this case of first impression, the 
court began its analysis by looking to the 
Act's purpose. As it had recognized in 
previous cases concerning the Act, the 
court reiterated that "'[t]he general pur-
pose of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act [is] to provide compensation for loss 
of earning capaCity resulting from acci-
dental injuries sustained in industrial em-
ployment. ", Id at 630, 569 A.2d at 700 
(quoting Bethlehem Shipyard v. 
Damasiewicz, 187Md.474,480,50A.2d 
799,802 (1947) (empasis added by the 
Victor court). Futhermore, the Act must 
be interpreted and construed to effectu-
ate this purpose. Id. at 628, 569 A.2d at 
699. The court also noted that there ex-
ists a legislatively required presumption 
in favor of injured employees that their 
claims fall within the Act's provisions. Id. 
at 628-29, 569 A.2d at 700. 
The Act itself, the court noted, estab-
lishes the duties that employers owe to 
their employees, providing, in part, that 
the employer shall payor provide com-
pensation "[flor the disability or death 
of his employee resulting from an acci-
dental personal injury sustained by the 
employee arising out of and in the course 
of his employment .... n Id at 626 n.l, 
569 A.2d at 698 n.l (quoting Md. Ann. 
Code art. 101 § 15 (1985 & Supp. 1989) 
(emphasis added)). Such compensation 
and benefits are referenced to disability 
throughout the statute. Thus, the court 
reasoned, it is the" disability" arising from 
the injury that calls for the compensation 
and benefits, yet "disability" is not explic-
itly defined in the Act with respect to an 
injury arising from an industrial accident. 
Id. at 629, 569 A.2d at 700. 
Thus, relying again on the Act's gen-
eral purpose and the mandate of a liberal 
construction in favor of injured employ-
ees, the court set forth to define the 
legislative intent of an industrial accident 
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disability. In terms of occupational dis-
eases, the legislature had defined "disabil-
ity" as the state of being incapacitated. 
The court had previously held that a 
claimant suffering from occupational dis-
ease need not show actual wage loss, but 
rather must show a permanent or tempo-
rary incapacity from employment. Id. at 
630-31, 569 A.2d at 700-0 1 (citing Miller 
v. Western Electric Co., 310 Md. 173,528 
A.2d 486 (1987)). In Miller, the court had 
warned that a strict adherence to a wage-
loss requirement for compensation 
would likely produce absurd results in-
consistent with the Act's purpose. Id. at 
631, 569 A.2d at 701. For instance, a 
physically disabled worker making ef-
forts to keep working would be deprived 
of an award based solely on lost wages. 
Thus, consistent with the Act's purpose, 
the court held that "disability," with re-
spect to industrial aCcidents, relates to 
diminished "earning capacity," and not 
to actual loss of wages per se. Id. at 632, 
569 A.2d at 701. 
In light of this definition, the court 
reasoned that Victor's voluntary retire-
ment was, therefore, of no consequence 
on his entitlement to compensation for 
temporary total disability. Id. at 632, 569 
A.2d at 702. Rather, his entitlement to 
compensation continued until his maxi-
mum earning capacity was fully restored. 
Id. at 633, 569 A.2d at 702. Victor was 
not barred from rejoining the labor force. 
If Victor had not been totally disabled, he 
could have sought and obtained employ-
This space contributed as a public service. 
ment elsewhere. Thus it was not Victor's 
retirement that impeded his earning ca-
pacity, but the disability resulting from 
his accidental injury. Id. Therefore, the 
court ruled that Victor was entitled to 
compensation. 
In holding that voluntary retirement 
does not bar a claimant from compensa-
tion for temporary total disability, the 
court of appeals expanded the 
employer's insurance liability by expand-
ing the scope of eligible claiments. Con-
sequently, employers and their 
insurance companies will have an even 
greater obligation to ensure the safety of 
employees. 
-Scot Morrell 
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